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 My thesis is this: in Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, there are two 
strands of rule-following skepticism and that they are intertwined but can be disentangled. My 
aim is to clarify how these strands differ and then answer one of the strands. 
 A few remarks by way of orientation: first, the strands of rule-following skepticism that I 
will be discussing also exist in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. However, Kripke's 
book is useful as a way of focusing our discussion on rule-following since its structure is more 
manageable than that of Philosophical Investigations. Second, I'm going to call my skeptic 
'Kripke' even though Kripke himself suggests it may be wrong to identify his own position with 
that of the skeptic's. I'm doing this just for the sake of locutionary ease. 
 Finally, before we (really) begin, we need to establish what shall be meant by two terms: 
Cartesian skepticism and Kantian skepticism;1 or perhaps equally, epistemological skepticism 
and metaphysical skepticism. One kind of skeptical worry is that of how we know things about 
rule-following; this is the epistemological/Cartesian thread. Cartesian skepticism is concerned 
with how we access, or ascertain, facts about rule-following. But it does not doubt the nature of 
such facts. The Cartesian skeptic accepts we know what a claim about rule-following means; he 
simply wonders whether we can ever be certain when making such a claim, whether we can 
really know such facts. The metaphysical/Kantian skeptic, however, is beset by a deeper anxiety. 
We can think of the Kantian skeptic as sidelining the Cartesian question of how we know facts 
about rule-following and asking after the constitution of such facts. In other words, Kantian 
skepticism is concerned with what claims of rule-following even mean. The onset of Kantian 
skepticism (in both Wittgenstein's and Kripke's work) is marked by the worry that there is 
nothing we mean when we speak of rule-following; or in other words, that there is nothing there 
to be a Cartesian skeptic about, that discourse on rule-following is not merely epistemologically 
difficult but simply nonsense.2 
                                                 
1 These terms come from Conant's Varieties of Skepticism. 
2 What are my grounds for claiming that Kripke himself makes this distinction? After all, maybe this is interesting 
philosophical taxonomy but not a way of thinking that can be assigned to Kripke. To the text, then. Early in 




2. Kripke's picture of rule-following 
 In this section of the talk, my aim is to bring out Kripke's picture of rule-following; that 
is, the metaphysical model on which he thinks rule-following must be construed. 
 Kripke asks a question that might be stated thus: what makes it the case that this—some 
action or event—is in accordance with this particular rule and not another one (or not in 
accordance with any rule at all)? More simply, what is it to follow a rule? Ultimately, for Kripke, 
                                                                                                                                                             
In the discussion below the challenge posed by the sceptic takes two forms. First, he questions 
whether there is any fact that I meant plus, not quus, that will answer his sceptical challenge. 
Second, he questions whether I have any reason to be so confident that now I should answer '125' 
rather than '5'. 
This quotation supports at least the conclusion that Kripke has in mind two strands of skepticism, the skeptic's 
challenge taking "two forms". And looking at these strands, it appears the first can be identified as a Kantian strand, 
the skeptic wondering whether there is any fact at all that distinguishes between meaning plus and quus, and that the 
second can be identified as Cartesian, the skeptic wondering whether I can know—and thus "be so confident"—that 
this is an application of the rule in question. 
We can see further (and conclusive) evidence of Kripke's awareness of this distinction in some of his descriptions of 
the shape of the skeptical dialectic. At one point Kripke writes, "the problem may appear to be epistemological... 
however... it is clear that the sceptical challenge is not really an epistemological one". The real challenge to rule-
following is the Kantian one, not a question of epistemology but a question of how there could even be such a thing 
as rule-following. In a telling passage, Kripke writes thus: 
 The sceptic...puts the challenge in terms of a sceptical hypothesis about a change in my usage... 
 Of course, ultimately, if the sceptic is right, the concepts of meaning and of intending one 
function rather than another will make no sense... But before we pull the rug out from under our 
own feet, we begin by speaking as if the notion that at present we mean a certain function by 'plus' 
is unquestioned and unquestionable. Only past usages are to be questioned. Otherwise, we will be 
unable to formulate the problem. 
Kripke consciously uses Cartesian skepticism as a way into the Kantian paradox, knowingly bringing the problem 
out through epistemological worries that are ultimately meant to give way to metaphysical/Kantian skepticism. In 
other words, Kripke poses the problem first as an epistemological 'how-do-you-know' question, but it quickly 
becomes apparent that this is the less pressing expression of skeptical anxiety. Kripke recognizes that it is not 
whether or not and how I know; the real question is what would I have to know in order to count as knowing the 
thing I purport to know? For Kripke, Cartesian skepticism is merely a vehicle for arriving at Kantian skepticism. 
In this paper, I mean to address the slide from Cartesian skepticism into Kantian skepticism. I argue against the latter 
form of skepticism but leave the former basically untouched. Perhaps this will seem a cop-out to some readers. Am I 
conceding skepticism? And if so, is this not a reprehensible feature of this essay? There are a couple of things to say 
in response to these charges. First, it seems to me that when it comes to rule-following Kantian skepticism should be 
addressed prior to Cartesian skepticism (unless there is a way to address both simultaneously, but no such possibility 
occurs to me). Before we entertain epistemological concerns (before we argue over whether we ever actually know 
claims of rule-following to obtain), we should determine what we are taking about, or that we are actually talking 
about something intelligible and not merely spouting nonsense. And this essay would be too long if I were to 
address Cartesian as well as Kantian skepticism. 
The second reason I leave Cartesian skepticism untouched: it seems the sorts of answers given in response to 
Cartesian skepticism elsewhere should, if they are good ones, be applicable here as well. 'Cartesian rule-following 
skepticism' does not strike me as a unique form of Cartesian skepticism (one posing its own special problems) but 
rather a particular application of its generic form, the problems it poses for rule-following being basically the same 
as those it poses elsewhere. And if we concede Cartesian skepticism, we at least understand what we are conceding, 
whereas concession to the Kantian skeptic seems intolerable in that concession erases the possibility of 
understanding that concession and so we are left with a paradox. 
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this is not a Cartesian question, one about how we access or ascertain facts of rule-following 
(though it begins a one), but rather a Kantian question about the constitution of following a rule. 
How is it so much as possible that an action be in accordance with a rule? How is it different 
from an action that is not in accordance with a rule, and what makes it so? And if it is impossible 
to distinguish between following a rule and not following one, the whole concept of rule-
following (its very intelligibility) must be lost to us and not just our (mere epistemological) 
ability to determine whether or not a particular case is one of rule-following. 
 No candidate answer to the question of rule-following is to be rejected solely because it 
references facts that it are epistemologically difficult, even impossible, to attain knowledge of. 
Kripke asks whether there is any fact at all that determines whether or not a rule is being 
followed regardless of whether there exists any hope of accessing such a fact. Kripke's ultimate 
conclusion is that there is no such fact, i.e. that there is nothing that distinguishes between 
following a rule and not following one, and thus is issued a skeptical paradox in which we are 
apparently forced to conclude (however impossibly) that there is no such thing as being in 
accordance with a rule. 
 Kripke argues that anything we do or think might be brought, on the strength of some 
interpretation, into accordance with multiple (and conflicting) rules governing our actions. For 
Kripke, this means there is no possibility (not even a hypothetical one) of distinguishing between 
something's being in accordance with any particular rule. In other words, all the facts to be found 
in a putative case of rule-following (one's actions, his 'mental contents', et cetera) do not add up 
to following any particular rule since these same facts would also be consistent with not 
following the same rule. In the face of the conclusion that there is nothing that is different 
between cases of following a particular rule and cases of following some different rule or even 
no rule, Kripke concludes that the whole concept of following a rule must be abandoned (or at 
least that the whole traditional concept must be abandoned). For, following a rule is only 
conceivable if it may be meaningfully contrasted with not following one, a contrast that he 
purports to have shown illusory.3 
                                                 
3 In ordinary cases, particular criteria are taken to warrant ascriptions of rule-following, and some explanations, 
interpretations, justifications, et cetera, do the necessary clarifying work in cases of confusion or misinterpretation. 
Sometimes we are certain that a rule is being followed or certain of how to follow it ourselves, and we do not 
consider the logically possible ambiguity of our criteria or any potential misunderstandings to unsettle our certainty. 
However, a particular clarification, interpretation, or criterion that works in some cases is no proof against every 
possible misinterpretation, and in this way our position as knowledgeable rule-followers may appear unstable. If the 
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 Kripke's skeptical argument works by showing that in no case is misinterpretation 
inconceivable, and it is this 'lack of assurance' against possible misinterpretations that motivates 
the beginning of the skeptical dialectic. For example, he challenges our grip of the plus function 
by suggesting a 'quus' function4 - that is, a function that is similar to addition to addition but with 
a crucial difference - and though the argument is ultimately supposed to lead to a place where 
both plus and 'quus' are unintelligible, it is motivated first by the skeptic raising the possibility of 
misinterpretation, showing that the criteria we had taken to determine the rule seem to permit 
possible mistakes. Thus the question is first the Cartesian one: how do I know this to be a case of 
rule-following? How can I rule out possible misinterpretations? When it comes to look like I 
cannot really know whether this is a case of rule-following (since I cannot rule out every 
possible misinterpretation), Kripke begins shifting registers and asks what would I have to know 
in order to know this to be a case of rule-following? So the dialectic evolves, moving its 
challenge from one of how you know (what you say you know) to a challenge of what you know 
(you say you know). 
 Our temptation towards claims about the general unintelligibility of rule-following is 
supposed to grow from our recognition of an ever-present potential for misinterpretation. It 
strikes us that nothing could close the gap between our criteria for and the correct interpretation 
of the rule, and on this way of thinking, we end up losing rule-following altogether. In this way, 
what seemed to be the harmless observation that any set of criteria could be misinterpreted 
deepens and eventually collapses the difference we had thought to exist between following and 
not following a rule. Thus the original Cartesian skepticism devolves into Kantian skepticism, 
and Kripke's epistemological challenge comes to reveal a deeper problematic. No longer is it 
incumbent on the anti-skeptic to show (merely) how we could know a case to be one of rule-
following; what a claim of rule-following even means has come under skeptical attack. 
 So Kripke disregards all ordinary answers to the question of rule-following, citing 
possible misinterpretations as proof of their inadequacy. But how does Kripke imagine a 
satisfactory answer would appear? What kind of answer would he accept? For surely there must 
be some kind of answer that Kripke thinks would suffice, certain criteria that he thinks if met 
                                                                                                                                                             
context shifts, if something new about the present circumstances comes to light or another viable interpretation is 
presented, we may be shaken in our conviction (and no longer warranted in saying) that this is a case of rule-
following or that this is how to apply a particular rule. 
4 Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, p. 9. 
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would constitute a good answer to his skepticism. Otherwise, he presupposes his conclusion of 
the impossibility of rule-following. In other words, Kripke has reasons for disregarding our 
ordinary answers to questions of rule-following, saying this answer is no good because it does 
not fit these criteria, and this means Kripke has in mind a template of how a good answer would 
look, i.e. certain criteria that a good answer would meet. 
 In considering the reasons he cites for disregarding our ordinary answers and asking what 
an answer that would not be excluded would have to look like, I think it becomes apparent: 
Kripke is after an 'essential' answer to the question of rule-following, i.e. an answer that would 
serve as an unassailable criterion of rule-following under any circumstances whatsoever. When 
he asks how we can be sure that a particular application really accords with the rule, Kripke is 
not satisfied by any answer that falls short of being ultimate, enquiry-ending, fool-proof; he 
seeks something that is unimpeachable in every case. Such a criterion would have to ensure by 
its mere presence in a case (whatever such a presence would amount to) whether it were one of 
rule-following. In principle, it could not be 'unsettled' by a shifting context. Kripke wants a fact 
that, should it obtain, implies rule-following with bilateral necessity; and we can see this is true 
by noticing that he rejects all answers that do not satisfy this condition.56 
 This absolute criterion that Kripke is apparently after begins to look like an 'essence' of 
rule-following. It could not be a mere concomitant feature of rule-following, something that as 
such could conceivably accompany a case that was not one of rule-following, for then such a fact 
would offer no infallible assurance that the case in which it obtained were one of rule-following. 
Philosophical clarity on the matter of rule-following, Kripke appears to think, would consist in 
isolating whatever it is that lies at the heart of rule-following and bringing that to light. The 
                                                 
5 To elaborate the point: though we ordinarily identify certain criteria as constitutive of following a particular rule, 
these criteria might be of no consideration in other cases or under different circumstances. Merely adding certain 
choice details to the case under consideration might cause us to take the same criteria to have a different sort of 
relevance (moving a pawn does not count as following the rules of chess for one who has no understanding of the 
game, but in another context, moving a pawn certainly does count as following the rules of chess). Kripke seeks, not 
a criterion for rule-following that settles the matter only for a particular context, but an answer that settles the matter 
in every conceivable eventuality, one that wards off every possible misinterpretation and that would tell us whether 
a case was one of rule-following whatever other circumstantial details obtain. 
6 It is a noteworthy feature of Kripke's picture of rule-following that, if a fact that thus constituted rule-following 
existed, it would only be necessary to look at a single moment, a 'snapshot', in order to determine whether or not a 
particular case were one of rule-following. Not only would other contemporaneous details be unimportant to this 
ultimate criterion, but also what preceded and followed would be unimportant. 
In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein writes in the voice of an interlocutor, "we grasp the meaning at a 
stroke, and what we grasp in this way is surely something different from the 'use' which is extended in time!" (p. 
59e, §138).  
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general thrust of Kripke's skeptical argument lies in showing that there is no such ultimate 
criterion, no essence lying beneath cases of rule-following, and it is this realization that moves 
him to his skeptical conclusion of the fictive nature of the concept of rule-following. 
 So far, I have paid special attention to how Kripke makes his skeptical argument, i.e. how 
he motivates the slide into paradox. I have asked what it is he is seeking, what he thinks would 
be necessary in order to render rule-following intelligible, for it is apparently in not finding this 
that one is brought to paradox. In answering these questions, it has become apparent that Kripke 
seeks the essence of rule-following. My aim has so far been purely descriptive, an attempt to 
clarify the framework of the Kripke's thinking. I have not attempted to say whether Kripke's 
position is defensible. 
 
3. Rule-following: a family portrait 
 In this section, my aim is to describe rule-following and draw from these descriptions an 
accurate model or picture. The upshot of these considerations will be that Wittgenstein's 'family 
resemblance picture' - and not the 'essence picture' - is true to rule-following as it is actually 
manifest in the world. 
 Looking at actual cases of rule-following, it is apparent that there are a variety of 
different things that are ordinarily considered criteria of rule-following. For example, sometimes 
one is said to be following a rule when he writes "2 + 2 = 4", or perhaps when he moves a chess 
piece, or when he consults an instruction manual and then proceeds to unscrew a lug nut. These 
are all possible cases of rule-following, and we are (ordinarily) warranted in claiming them to be 
so though we might hesitate to say we have identified an essential criterion in any of them. 
 One way in which Wittgenstein attempts to make rule-following's lack of an essence 
apparent is by asking questions like could this be an instance of rule-following; could someone 
follow a rule in this way? What I think one is meant to see in considering these cases is that it is 
necessary to fill out a context, however roughly, to get a handle on what it would be for such 
things to be cases of rule-following or not. What sorts of practices, institutions, customs, and so 
on, must we imagine in order for this to be a case of rule-following? In what surroundings would 
these criteria warrant a claim of rule-following (and in what contexts would these 'same' criteria 
be unrecognizable as such)? Since Kripke is after the essence of rule-following, asking if certain 
criteria are ipso facto constitutive of rule-following, he thinks there would have to be some final 
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criterion that holds regardless of whatever further circumstances obtain. Wittgenstein's examples, 
however, make it apparent that, deprived of a context, the answers that can be given to questions 
about whether certain criteria constitute rule-following drift into indeterminacy. It is only when 
deployed in some context that our criteria have any life. Wittgenstein writes: 
It is only in normal cases that the use of a word is clearly laid out in advance for 
us; we know, are in no doubt, what we have to say in this or that case. The more 
abnormal the case, the more doubtful it becomes what we are to say.7 
It is only under certain circumstances that anything might constitute rule-following. Any 
criterion of rule-following "presupposes as a surrounding particular circumstances, particular 
forms of life and speech [just as] there is no such thing as a facial expression without a face".8 
Bereft of the circumstances in which they occur, our criteria for rule-following lose their 
significance.9 
 There is no essence lying under cases of rule-following, an essence that may be brought 
into focus by excluding our 'non-essential' criteria. I previously argued that the skeptic is 
functioning with an 'essence picture' of rule-following. I think it evident, though, that this is not a 
characterization of rule-following that is true to our actual practices and language-game(s) 
surrounding rule-following. Observation of our every-day lives, of what we do and how we 
                                                 
7 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, pp. 61e - 62e, §142. 
8 Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, p. 414, VII, §47. 
9 Contrary to the picture of rule-following with which Kripke is working, rule-following is not something that can 
always be 'pinned down' to a single moment or to a definite—i.e. sharply bounded—period of time (though it may 
sometimes be). On some occasions, when did he really follow the rule is a bad question. Asking (and insisting on) 
such a question can lead to confusion when in fact all is known and in the open. Wittgenstein demonstrates how this 
takes place with questions we might try to ask about chess; he writes, "What if one asked: When can you play 
chess? All the time? Or just while you are making a move? - And how odd that being able to play chess should take 
such a short time, and a game so much longer!". Thus a game of chess, something which may unexceptionally last 
several hours, now may (on this way of thinking) appear as though it lasted so much longer than the actual playing 
of the game (a bizarre conclusion). When it comes to playing chess, I want to say nothing is hidden. In ordinary 
circumstances, an exact description of what is going on (strategy excluded) is easily achieved and not perplexing 
(i.e. there is ordinarily no confusion over when the participants are really playing chess; such questions either do not 
occur to us or, if they do, do not bother us for they are easily answered). If someone should pose this question and, 
moreover, appear to be confused by it, we should echo Wittgenstein and say that his question contains a mistake: the 
mistake of assuming we must be able to name a span of time—with sharp boundaries—that one can actually play 
chess. The language-game that revolves around chess (and more broadly rule-following in general) does not 
(always) speak of rule-following in this way and simply has no answer to the question of when one can really play 
chess. As a result, when asking such questions of rule-following, we become confused by the grammar, and we 
suppose there must be definite temporal boundaries to be set around games of chess (and cases of rule-following). 
However, this supposition arises, not from observation of our practices, but because of the influence of a particular 
picture of rule-following. We assume something like Kripke's essence picture, and this gives rise to the idea that we 
must be able to give a definite answer to these sorts of questions. Observation of the actual language-game, though, 
makes it apparent that the question is an unnatural one. 
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speak, suggests that there is no unassailable criterion in cases of rule-following. Rather, to 
borrow a term Wittgenstein uses elsewhere in Philosophical Investigations,10 cases of rule-
following share family resemblances and can be recognized and understood as such without the 
existence of any essential feature undergirding them.11 
 I have offered an alternative picture of rule-following, one holding that knowledge of 
rule-following involves no unassailable criterial knowledge. Thus it is a picture that palpably 
differs from Kripke's essence picture. The knowledge we have of rule-following may be 
fruitfully compared to an ability—a case of 'know-how'—as opposed to knowledge that can be 
made exhaustively discursively explicit. If rule-following had an essence, then one would be 
obliged to know that essence in order to (really) know a case to be one of rule-following. 
However, if there is no essence of rule-following, then we are not obliged to demonstrate 
knowledge of any such thing in order to vindicate the claim that we understand rule-following 
(i.e. what it is or how to do it). If rule-following is better captured by the family resemblance 
picture, then our knowledge of it will show itself as an ability, and this reflects no lack on our 
part but rather is indicative of what rule-following itself is. 
 
4. Reassessing rule-following skepticism 
 In this last section, I will reassess Kripke's skeptical claims in light of what has emerged, 
i.e., that he assumes an essence picture of rule-following while the family resemblance picture is 
in fact a better characterization of it. 
 Kripke is after an indefeasible criterion of rule-following, but it begins to looks as if this 
search were always bound to fail. Taking the essence picture in conjunction with a form of 
Cartesian skepticism leads Kripke to Kantian skepticism since, in any case (described as one) of 
rule-following, it seems possible to conceive of further (as of yet unknown or unspecified) 
                                                 
10 See, for example, Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 36e, §67. 
11 I do not mean to suggest that there are a number of disjunctive, interwoven properties that hold together all cases 
of rule-following (or in other words that rule-following has a complex essence, one comprised of a series of 
disjunctions). In saying that cases of rule-following can be thought of as sharing family resemblances, I am 
suggesting a picture that is in opposition to the supposition that rule-following—either in general or in particular 
cases—has an essence, or something lying 'below the surface' in virtue of which it is what it is (as perhaps one is a 
man in virtue of being a rational animal). The term 'family resemblance' may be misleading if one takes it to mean 
the point is mainly one about relationships between cases of rule-following. The focus is better understood as being 
on individual cases. Holding only one case to be in question, we do not (take ourselves to) need an essential feature, 
an indefeasible warrant, in order to recognize it as a case of rule-following (which we can see by observing the 
language-games that surround cases of rule-following). 
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details that may obtain and thus change (our assessment of) the case from 'rule-following' to 'not 
rule-following'. This is so far a Cartesian skepticism, a comment on the nature of our ability to 
ascertain certain facts about the world, but Kripke, working implicitly with his essence picture of 
rule-following, thinks there must be an unimpeachable criterion of rule-following, one that is not 
susceptible to being unsettled by the revelation of further imaginable circumstances, and rejects 
every answer that fails to meet this standard. Upon rightly concluding that there is no such thing, 
he arrives at the rule-following paradox. It is, in other words, his failure to successfully construe 
rule-following on the essence picture that leads Kripke to declare rule-following impossible.12 
 But since there is an alternative to the essence picture of rule-following, it does not seem 
necessary to give up rule-following altogether due to its failure to be rendered comprehensible 
within the framework of the essence picture. Before attempting to espouse such an unstable 
position, one should ask whether the family resemblance picture might better serve as a model 
for rule-following, and if so, whether we should replace the essence picture with it.1314 So when 
it becomes apparent that the essence picture is not a good fit for rule-following it becomes an 
important task to search for a new model (insofar as finding a new one might prove helpful), one 
that serves as a better object of comparison for our actual practices, helping us understand them 
as they really are. 
 The failure to make sense of rule-following when it is construed on the essence picture 
shows, not the failure of rule-following tour court, but the failure of rule-following to be 
construed on such a picture. Wittgenstein describes this situation perfect when he writes, "The 
more closely we examine actual language, the greater the conflict between it and our 
requirement... The conflict becomes intolerable; the requirement is now in danger of becoming 
vacuous".15 Kripke has certain requirements for rule-following that, upon investigation, go 
unmet, and the failure to meet these requirements renders unintelligible the very thing we were 
                                                 
12 Wittgenstein describes an impulse to say something like, 'But this isn't how it is—yet this is how it has to be'; and 
this is an accurate characterization of where Kripke finds himself—surprised by the dissonance between his model 
and reality—and this leads him to paradox. 
13 In fact, it is not obvious whether a picture of rule-following is necessary at all. Do we need to replace the essence 
picture with another, or can we do away with pictures altogether? I am not sure how to answer this question, but no 
matter the answer, jettisoning the essence picture is both viable and necessary. 
14 After all, the use of the model or picture is to help us understand reality; it is not to dictate to reality how it must 
really be. Wittgenstein writes: we can avoid unfairness or vacuity in our assertions only by presenting the model as 
what it is, as an object of comparison - as a sort of yardstick; not as a preconception to which reality must 
correspond. (The dogmatism into which we fall so easily in doing philosophy). 
15 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 51e, §107. 
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trying to understand. Once, however, it has been made explicit that it is only a certain picture 
that is untenable, new paths open, and we can go on. 
 In fact, once it is made clear that the skeptic shows the failure, not of the concept of rule-
following tout court, but rather of rule-following to fit the essence picture, Kripke's argument 
can be regarded as a reductio ad absurdum of this picture, a clever way of showing that the 
premise that rule-following has an essence—and thus that knowledge of it requires an 
unassailable criterion—is a bad one. But in order to claim that the Kripke's skeptical arguments 
are a reductio of his position, it is necessary to make explicit the premise that is under attack and 
that can be jettisoned. Without this, we lack a vantage point from which to observe the 
destruction of the reductio.16 
 But after replacing the essence picture with the family resemblance picture, are Kripke's 
skeptical concerns not still applicable? Do not the exact same problems arise no matter the 
'picture' with which we function? Well, I think the answer is no. 
 In an ordinary case of rule-following, it is easy to say what counts as following a rule, 
which rule is being followed, how we know one is following it, and so on. Kripke introduces 
what we can call an 'unsettling element' into ordinary cases of rule-following, one that shows that 
a doubt is conceivable by introducing either a possible misinterpretation or certain other facts 
about the case that suggest a reassessment of whether the case is one of rule-following.17 These 
are presented as possibilities, conceivable interpretations that one must be able to head-off if one 
is not to fall into skepticism. In this way, Kripke purports to show that the criteria named as 
constitutive of rule-following were inadequate. However, when Kripke adds 'unsettling elements' 
to the case in question, answering him is still a possibility. One can still say what constitutes 
rule-following under these new circumstances, in light of these new facts.18 (I say these are new 
facts and, therefore, circumstances because they must be contrary to what was assumed of the 
case; otherwise they would have no power to 'unsettle' our previous assessment.) We should say 
to Kripke, "Now that the circumstances have changed, this is how I know this to be a case of 
                                                 
16 We might capture the point with a metaphor: we realize we are sawing off the branch upon which we are sitting 
but see no other way to saw at all and so are paralyzed—any movement threatens to send us crashing to paradox. 
17 He suggests a bizarre quus-like function and similar things (we can, for example, also imagine him suggesting a 
Martian's finding it natural to interpret a drawing different than do we, or a pupil's finding it natural to taking the 
direction count by twos differently than do we, and so on). 




rule-following (or to not be a case of rule-following, or to be a case that is indeterminate)", and 
this should no longer appear problematic once we have shifted pictures of rule-following. 
 In a shifting context, the criteria that constitute rule-following change too. This is no 
challenge to our practices or to the concept of rule-following, and it appears so only if rule-
following is thought of as requiring an essence, i.e. something not susceptible to skeptical 
'unsettling elements'. Once rule-following comes to be thought of on the family resemblance 
picture—once the notion of an essence of rule-following is abandoned—the fact that different 
circumstances give rise to different criteria and that there are no ultimate criteria of rule-
following become mere commonplaces. Since there is nothing that must 'lie below' every case of 
rule-following, nothing that must settle the matter for every possible eventuality, the observation 
that all our criteria may be unsettled no longer appears puzzling—this is simply a feature of rule-
following and our knowledge of it.19 
 The logical possibility of doubt that Kripke demonstrates can be raised in, perhaps, any 
case at all only shows there to be a question of Cartesian skepticism at hand. That differing 
circumstances give rise to different criteria of rule-following and that no criterion is unassailable 
reveals only that rule-following is without essence. Kripke's 'arguments from possible 
misinterpretation' - i.e. his Cartesian skeptical worries - lead to Kantian skepticism when 
combined with the essence picture of rule-following, but upon reflection, this picture of rule-
following can simply be let go. When Kripke's arguments from possible misinterpretation are 
applied to the family resemblance picture of rule-following, there arises no Kantian problem 
about the intelligibility of rule-following. We stop the slide into the general unintelligibility of 
rule-following before the skeptical dialectic gains momentum. Thus when it comes to rule-
following, Cartesian skepticism does not give way to Kantian skepticism. If the skeptic raises a 
                                                 
19 In other words, we should exhort Kripke to take notice of the ease with which we say what counts as rule-
following (and why it does) in ordinary cases but to not expect any final answer on the matter. To expect such is to 
be misled about the nature of (knowledge of) rule-following, and thus our lack of ability to give an ultimate answer 
does not signify a lack of understanding of what it is that distinguishes between one's following a rule and one's not 
following a rule. If the nature of the case changes, we may change our assessment entirely or adjust our answer, but 
Kripke is unable to raise a worry about the general intelligibility of rule-following since this possibility hinges on 
viewing rule-following as necessarily having an essence. Thus Kripke's 'deep' skeptical questions about rule-
following can be given ordinary answers. In one deflationary passage, Wittgenstein writes: 
Where is the connection effected between the sense of the words "Let's play a game of chess" and 
all the rules of the game? - Well, in the list of rules of the game, in the teaching of it, in the 
everyday practice of playing". 
Whereas the interlocutor here takes himself to be asking a 'deep' question, Wittgenstein responds as though it were 
quite an ordinary one, requiring an ordinary answer—for given the right picture of rule-following this is the only 
kind of question we should feel compelled to answer. 
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concern that purports to be general, it is in the search of the essence of rule-following—
something we should not expect to exist and whose non-existence should leave us nonplussed. 
As long as we try to cram rule-following into the mold of the essence picture, we shall fail to 
perspicuously describe our practices, but after that mold is swapped for the family resemblance 
picture, all falls back into place and our concept of rule-following makes sense once again. 
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